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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 20, 2010 we marked—I cannot say celebrated—the 
sesquicentennial of South Carolina’s secession.  By the end of February 
1861, six other states had followed South Carolina into the Confederacy.  
Most scholars fully understand that slavery was at the root of secession 
and the war that followed.  As Abraham Lincoln noted in his second 
inaugural in 1865, “[o]ne-eighth of the whole population were colored 
slaves, not distributed generally over the Union, but localized in the 
southern part of it.  These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful 
interest.  All knew that this interest was somehow the cause of the war.”1    
What Lincoln admitted in 1865, Confederate leaders asserted much 
earlier.  After secession but before the Civil War broke out, Alexander 
H. Stephens, the Confederate vice president and one of the two most 
perceptive and brightest men in the Confederate government,2 forcefully 
set out the reasons for secession in his famous “Cornerstone Speech.”  
Here, Stephens tied slavery to race, making clear that the cornerstone of 
the Confederacy was not merely chattel slavery, but the total 
 
∗ President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy and Senior Fellow 
in the Government Law Center, Albany Law School; John Hope Franklin Visiting Professor in 
American Legal History, Duke Law School, Fall 2012. 
 1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Second Inaugural Address, in 8 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 332 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
 2. The other one was Judah P. Benjamin, who held a number of positions in the Confederate 
cabinet and then enjoyed a second career as one of the leading barristers in England. 
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subordination of black people for the benefit of white people.  In this 
sense the Confederacy was the political grandparent of Nazi Germany 
and apartheid-era South Africa— regimes founded on the assumption of 
the racial and ethnic superiority of the ruling class and the utter 
inferiority and subordination of other races and groups.  Thus Stephens 
declared that, “Our new government is founded upon . . . its foundations 
are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not 
equal to the white man; that slavery —subordination to the superior race 
—is his natural and normal condition.”3    
Stephens denounced the northern claims (which he incorrectly 
attributed to Thomas Jefferson) that the “enslavement of the African was 
in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, 
morally, and politically.”4  He unabashedly asserted:  “Our new 
government is founded upon exactly the opposite idea.”5  Stephens 
argued that it was “insanity” to believe “that the negro is equal” or that 
slavery was wrong.6  He proudly predicted that the Confederate 
Constitution “has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating 
to our peculiar institution—African slavery as it exists amongst us—the 
proper status of the negro in our form of civilization.”7 
Stephens only echoed South Carolina’s declaration, explaining that 
it was leaving the Union because 
A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the 
States north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high 
office of President of the United States, whose opinions and purposes 
are hostile to slavery.  He is to be entrusted with the administration of 
the common Government, because he has declared that that 
“Government cannot endure permanently half slave, half free,” and 
that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course 
of ultimate extinction.8   
 
 3. Alexander H. Stephens, The Corner Stone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), reprinted in HENRY 
CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE. WITH LETTERS AND SPEECHES, 
BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE WAR 717, 721 (Philadelphia, National Publishing Co. 1886). 
 4. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South 
Carolina from the Federal Union (1861), reprinted in J.A. MAY & J.R. FAUNT, SOUTH CAROLINA 
SECEDES 76-81 (1960), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/csa_scarsec.asp (last 
visited Sept. 24, 2011).  This was adopted four days after the state officially seceded.  The 
Declarations of Secession for Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas are conveniently 
found at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/csapage.asp. 
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In other words, South Carolina was leaving the Union because Lincoln 
believed slavery was wrong and should one day—in the far distant 
future—be ended.   
Shortly after South Carolina left the Union, Georgia did the same.  
Beginning with the second sentence of its Declaration of Secession, 
Georgia made it clear that slavery was the force behind secession:   
For the last ten years we have had numerous and serious causes of 
complaint against our non-slave-holding confederate States with 
reference to the subject of African slavery.  They have endeavored to 
weaken our security, to disturb our domestic peace and tranquility, and 
persistently refused to comply with their express constitutional 
obligations to us in reference to that property, and by the use of their 
power in the Federal Government have striven to deprive us of an 
equal enjoyment of the common Territories of the Republic.  This 
hostile policy of our confederates has been pursued with every 
circumstance of aggravation which could arouse the passions and 
excite the hatred of our people, and has placed the two sections of the 
Union for many years past in the condition of virtual civil war.9   
Mississippi emphatically made the same point, starting with the second 
sentence of its Declaration:  “Our position is thoroughly identified with 
the institution of slavery—the greatest material interest of the world.”10 
Despite the almost universal understanding of serious scholars that 
slavery and racial subordination were at the root of secession and the 
Civil War—and the almost endless statements of Confederate leaders 
supporting this analysis—a considerable number of Americans cling to 
the belief that secession was about “states’ rights,” and that southerners 
left the Union to escape a tyrannical national government that was 
trampling on their rights.  Advocates of this old fashioned, and 
simultaneously modern, neo-Confederate ideology rarely discuss the 
substance of southern states’ rights claims, because they will either lead 
to an intellectual dead end, or lead back to slavery. 
The relationship of secession to states’ rights is often 
misunderstood, especially by those who argue that the slave states left 
 
 9. Georgia Secession (1861), reprinted in 1 FRED C. AINSWORTH & JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY, 
THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE ARMIES 81-85 (Ser. 4, 1900), available at http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=Georgia;rgn=full%20text;idno=waro0127; 
didno=waro0127;view=image;seq=0093. 
 10. A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the 
State of Mississippi from the Federal Union (1861), reprinted in JOURNAL OF THE STATE 
CONVENTION 86-88 (Jackson, E. Barksdale 1861), available at http://docsouth.unc.edu/ 
imls/msconven/menu.html (last visited May 6, 2012). 
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the Union to protect their states’ rights.  The southern states did not 
leave the Union because the national government was trampling on their 
“rights.”   The states that left the union never asserted that they were 
being denied their “states’ rights” —that the national government had 
obliterated the lines been between national power and state power.  Nor 
did the southern states complain that the national government was too 
powerful and so it threatened the sovereignty of the state governments.  
On the contrary, as I set out below, the southern states mostly 
complained that the northern states were asserting their states’ rights and 
that the national government was not powerful enough to counter these 
northern claims.  Similarly, the secessionists did not complain that an 
oppressive national government was infringing on the civil liberties of 
southern citizens; rather the complaint was that the national government 
refused to suppress the civil liberties of northern citizens.   
When considering federal law and policy in 1860, the southern 
states should have had almost no complaints.  Since 1850, they had won 
almost every debate in Congress and almost every federal law dealing 
with slavery had benefited the South.  A series of Supreme Court 
decisions on slave transit,11 black citizenship,12 the right of masters to 
take slaves into the territories,13 and the constitutionality of the Fugitive 
Slave Law of 185014 had all favored the South.  Significantly, two of 
these decisions were unanimous, even though throughout the period four 
of the nine Justices were northerners.  Two of the northerners dissented 
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Court’s most proslavery decision of the 
decade.15  But, by 1860, one of these dissenters, Benjamin R. Curtis, had 
left the Court and been replaced by an adamantly proslavery northern 
Democrat, Nathan Clifford. 
II.  THE 1850S:  THE HIGH POINT OF PROSLAVERY NATIONALISM 
The 1850s was a remarkable decade for supporters of slavery.  In 
three areas of law—involving the territories, the recovery of fugitive 
slaves, and the right to travel with slaves—all three branches of the 
national government expanded the rights of slave owners.  At the same 
 
 11. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851). 
 12. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
 15. Arguably, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), was equally as proslavery.  
For a discussion of this point, see Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994). 
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time, in two other areas of law, the national government dramatically 
restricted the rights of free blacks.   
By the end of the decade, slavery was legal in all the federal 
territories, the federal government was vigorously enforcing a draconian 
fugitive slave law that had enabled hundreds of masters to recover their 
runaways, and the Supreme Court had expanded the right of masters to 
travel in the free states with their slaves.  Furthermore, the Court hinted 
that it would guarantee masters even greater rights of transit, when given 
the opportunity to do so.16  Congress prohibited blacks from testifying 
on their own behalf at a fugitive slave hearing, suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus for alleged fugitives throughout the nation to remand 
them to slave catchers, and provided harsh punishments for anyone 
interfering with the return of a fugitive slave.  Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court ruled that blacks, even if free, and even if accorded equal rights of 
citizenship in their own states, would never be considered citizens of the 
United States, and in effect had no rights under the Constitution.  At the 
same that it denied any constitutional rights to free blacks, the Court 
held that slavery was a specially protected institution under the 
Constitution.  Under the Court’s reasoning, Congress could, and should, 
protect slavery property in the territories, but could never restrict it. 
A. Restrictions and Limitations on Slavery in 1850 
In 1850, southerners could not have imagined they would be so 
successful in securing federal support for slavery over the next ten years.  
At the beginning of the decade, slave owners were closed out of virtually 
all of the existing federal territories.  The United States had acquired 
vast amounts of land from Mexico, but the area was closed to slavery.  
During the Mexican War, the House of Representatives had passed the 
Wilmot Proviso, banning slavery from the new territories.  The Proviso 
never made it through the Senate, where the South had a majority from 
early 1845 until mid-1848.17  But, even after the North gained parity in 
the Senate, it was impossible to pass any law organizing the new 
territories.  Thus, the new territories remained unorganized with no 
 
 16. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 17. The admission of Florida on March 3, 1845 gave the South a one state majority in the 
Senate.  Texas admission on December 29, 1845 gave the South a two state majority.  The South 
maintained this two state majority until December 28, 1846 when Iowa entered the Union, and 
parity was not reached until Wisconsin became a state on May 26, 1848.  This history undermines 
the notion, perpetuated by many scholars, that the admission of California ended a history of parity 
in the Senate.  With the opening of the Mexican Cession to slavery it was perfectly possible to 
imagine new slaves states entering the Union in the southwest. 
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functioning government.  Meanwhile, thousands of people poured into 
California after gold was discovered there.  With no territorial 
government, there were no laws allowing slavery and the only existing 
law was that of Mexico, which prohibited slavery.  Thus, slave-owners 
felt cut out of the gold rush and unable to move into what would later 
become Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Nevada, and much of Colorado. 
Slavery was also officially excluded in all of the land left over from 
the Louisiana Purchase except the Indian Territory, but white slave 
owners had little opportunity to move there.  Nor was slavery allowed in 
the Oregon country—the present-day states of Oregon, Washington, and 
part of Idaho.  Southerners believed they should be entitled to settle the 
new lands acquired from Mexico, especially because southerners had 
disproportionately fought in the Mexican War.  Indeed the two heroes of 
the Mexican War were Zachary Taylor, a Kentuckian by birth who 
owned sugar plantations and many slaves in Louisiana,18 and Winfield 
Scott, who was a slaveowner from Virginia.19  Many southerners also 
believed that the Compromise of 1820, which banned slavery north of 
the southern boundary of Missouri, unconstitutionally deprived them of 
a right to settle land owned by all Americans.20  
In 1850, masters had a constitutional right to recover slaves 
wherever they could find them.  The Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 
authorized federal judges and state and local magistrates at any level to 
hear fugitive slaves cases, and remand runaways to those who claimed 
them.21  In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,22 the Supreme Court had given 
masters a right of recaption to seize fugitive slaves wherever they found 
them and peacefully take them south without any judicial 
superintendence.23  However, this right was mostly impossible to assert 
in taking slaves that had traveled far into the North.  To recover slaves 
who were more than a day’s ride from the South, masters needed the 
help of law enforcement officers.  But, after Prigg, most northern states 
passed laws closing their jails and courtrooms to slave catchers and 
prohibiting states officials from helping to recover runaway slaves.24  
 
 18. See JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, ZACHARY TAYLOR (2008).  
 19. See JOHN S.D. EISENHOWER, AGENT OF DESTINY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF GENERAL 
WINFIELD SCOTT (1999). 
 20. JAMES A. DORR, JUSTICE TO THE SOUTH! AN ADDRESS 10 (New York, 1856). 
 21. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). 
 22. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 23. For a full discussion of the proslavery implications of Prigg, see Finkelman, supra note 
15.  See also Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 24 (1993). 
 24. Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a 
Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIS. 5 (1979). 
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Typical of this state activity was Massachusetts’s “Latimer Law,” which 
prohibited any state judge from hearing a case under the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1793, or any sheriff or other official from arresting a fugitive 
slave.25  Any judge, sheriff, or other state or local official violating this 
law could be fined and imprisoned.26  Thus, while southerners had a 
right to recover runaway slaves anywhere in the nation, they lacked the 
ability to easily do so.  Without federal enforcement, southerners seeking 
runaways would be frustrated by northern states’ rights. 
By 1850, most of the free states had adopted the principle that no 
one could be held as a slave without positive law. 27  This principle was 
first articulated by Chief Justice Lord Mansfield in Somerset v. 
Stewart,28 which was decided in Britain before the American Revolution 
and thus was part of the common law at the time of Independence.  
Under the Somerset principle, masters could not travel with their slaves 
through most of the North without the risk of losing them.  During and 
after the Revolution, some of the northern states had made 
accommodations for visiting masters.  Pennsylvania granted them a right 
of transit of up to six months29 and New York gave them nine months.30  
But in 1841, New York repealed its law31 and Pennsylvania did the same 
in 1847.32  Thus, by 1850, southern masters felt deprived of their right to 
travel throughout the nation with their slaves.  Similarly, under the 
Missouri Compromise, they were prohibited from taking their slaves 
into the western territories, even for a visit.33 
 
 25. An Act Further to Protect Personal Liberty, 1843 Mass. Acts ch 69 at 33.   
 26. Id.  For a full history of these laws, see THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE 
PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 1780-1861 (1974). 
 27. For detailed discussions of these laws and the common law evolution of this principle in 
the North, see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 
(1981). 
 28. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).  For a discussion of this case, see 
WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-
1848 (1977). 
 29. 1 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 492-96 (Philadelphia, 1810). 
 30. 1799 NY Laws, ch. 62., reenacted in 1817 N.Y. Laws, ch. 137. 
 31. 1841 N.Y. Laws, ch. 247. 
 32. Act of March 3, 1847, 1847 Pa. Laws 206.  For detailed discussions of these laws and the 
common law evolution of this principle in the North, see FINKELMAN, supra note 27. 
 33. As the facts of Dred Scott show, some masters, like Captain John Emerson, did take their 
slaves into the area, especially those like Captain John Emerson, who were posted at military bases.  
Most masters, however, did not venture into the area with their property.  For example, in an 
unreported case a court in Muscatine, Iowa emancipated the slave Jim White whose master brought 
him there before statehood.  The Negro Case, BLOOMINGTON HERALD, Nov. 18, 1848.  See also J.P. 
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Thus, as the 1850s began, slaveowners had reason to complain 
about the legal structure of the nation.  In their own states, slaveowners 
were secure.  Despite annoying denunciations of slavery by abolitionists 
and antislavery Senators and Congressmen, the national government had 
no constitutional power to interfere with slavery in the existing states.  
The states’ rights of the southern states were secure.  But, southerners 
felt their federal constitutional rights were at risk when they entered the 
free states because those states emancipated any slaves voluntarily 
brought within their jurisdiction.34  Thus, southerners felt that the 
northern states were denying them the right to travel with their 
constitutional sanctioned property.  Similarly, if their slaves ran away to 
the free states, those states refused to fulfill their constitutional 
obligation by cooperating in the return of fugitive slaves.    
B. The Great Proslavery Shift of the 1850s 
In the 1850s, supporters of slavery won huge victories in Congress, 
which legalized slavery throughout the west.  Congress further protected 
the rights of masters to recover fugitive slaves with a new and 
powerfully nationalistic fugitive slave law.  Added to this were Supreme 
Court decisions which made slavery a specially protected institution 
under the Constitution, allowed slavery in all the federal territories, 
concluded that free blacks had virtually no rights under the Constitution 
and could never be considered citizens of the United States, and 
undermined the right of free states to emancipate visiting slaves.   
1. The Compromise of 1850 
In January of 1850, Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky introduced a 
series of resolutions to settle the pending issues before the nation.35  
Clay’s resolutions, and his Omnibus Bill that followed, overwhelmingly 
favored the South.  Clay’s Omnibus Bill ultimately collapsed, and was 
revived in a series of separate laws known as the Compromise of 1850.36  
The Compromise organized the new territories without any ban on 
slavery, thus opening more than 400,000 square miles to masters and 
their bondsmen and bondswomen.  This eviscerated the Missouri 
Compromise, which Clay himself had crafted in 1820, by allowing 
 
 34. FINKELMAN, supra note 27.  
 35. Paul Finkelman, The Appeasement of 1850, in CONGRESS AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1850S 
36 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2012).   
 36. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 98-101 (Don E. Fehrenbacher 
ed., 1976). 
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slavery north of the 36° 30' parallel.37  Much of the Mexican Cession—
what became Utah and Nevada and parts of Colorado and Wyoming—
was north of the Missouri Compromise line.  In addition to this, the 
Compromise gave Texas tens of thousands of acres of land and ten 
million dollars so that the government in Austin could pay off its pre-
statehood debts.38    
In return for these sweeping concessions to slavery in the west, the 
Compromise brought California into the Union as a free state.  This was 
hardly a concession to the free states, however, because by the time 
Congress passed the California bill there were nearly 100,000 free 
people there and at most, a few hundred slaves.39  California was 
destined to be a free state and even southern nationalists knew this.  This 
gave the free states a two vote majority in the Senate, but there was no 
reason to believe that this would be permanent.  The rest of the Mexican 
Cession was large enough to accommodate five or six or even more new 
slave states.40  
The Compromise also dealt with two non-territorial issues 
involving slavery.  The new Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was one of the 
most repressive and unfair federal laws in our history.41  The law 
provided for the appointment of federal commissioners in every county 
who, along with judges, were required to “hear and determine the case” 
in “a summary manner” without a jury.42  Under this law, the slave 
owner or his agent had only to present “satisfactory proof” that the 
person claimed was a fugitive slave.43  This could be done by 
“deposition or affidavit” certified “in writing” before any judge or 
magistrate in the home state of the slave owner.44  The potential for 
fraud, or even mistaken identity, was huge.  The claimant could bring 
any black who fit the description in the “deposition or affidavit” before a 
judge and demand the right to remove the person as a fugitive slave.45 
 
 37. Finkelman, Appeasement of 1850, supra note 35, at 54; Paul Finkelman, The Cost of 
Compromise and the Covenant with Death, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 845 (2011). 
 38. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, 9 Stat. 446. 
 39. Finkelman, The Cost of Compromise and the Covenant with Death, supra note 37, at 862. 
 40. For a more detailed discussion of the 1850 debate, see id., and PAUL FINKELMAN, 
MILLARD FILLMORE (2011). 
 41. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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Alleged fugitives were prohibited from testifying at their own 
hearings, even to explain that the wrong person had been seized.46  The 
law also prohibited any judge—state or federal—from issuing a writ of 
habeas corpus for an alleged slave.  This was the first time Congress had 
ever suspended the writ of habeas corpus—and it was done in clear 
violation of the procedures set out in the U.S. Constitution.47  The habeas 
provision of the Constitution envisioned a suspension for an immediate 
emergency caused by an invasion or rebellion.  But in 1850 Congress 
indefinitely suspended the Great Writ throughout the whole country 
even though there was no immediate crisis. 
Under the law, anyone aiding a fugitive slave or interfering with the 
rendition process was subject to a $1,000 fine plus court costs, six 
months in jail, and civil damages of $1,000 to be paid to the slave owner 
for each slave who was not recovered.48  If literally enforced, a 
northerner could be fined, sued, or jailed for merely giving a black 
person walking down the road a piece of bread or a cup of water, or 
allowing the black traveler to sleep in his barn.  Hiring a black who 
turned out to be a fugitive came with enormous potential costs.  In an 
age when there were no meaningful forms of identification, and thus no 
way to know if a black was free or a fugitive, the law effectively 
encouraged northerners—even free black northerners —to refuse to hire 
blacks because they might turn out to be fugitive slaves.  The harsh 
penalties, and the minimal standards of proof, could force northern 
whites to assume that all blacks they saw were fugitives even though in 
1850 there were more than 150,000 free blacks living in the North.49  
From the perspective of blacks and many white northerners, the Act of 
1850 had brought the law of slavery into the free states and required 
northerners to do the bidding of southerners. 
 
 46. Id. (“In no trial or hearing under this act shall the testimony of such alleged fugitive be 
admitted in evidence.”). 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).  See Paul Finkelman, Limiting 
Rights in Times of Crisis:  Our Civil War Experience – A History Lesson for a Post-9-11 America, 2 
CARDOZO PUBLIC L. POLICY & ETHICS J. 25 (2003). 
 48. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 7. 
 49. The Court had essentially held this in Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).  
Van Zandt, an Ohio farmer, gave a ride in his wagon to nine blacks walking along the road.  Id. at 
219.  They were all fugitives belonging to Jones, a Kentucky slave owner.  Id. at 218.  Jones 
successfully sued Van Zandt for the value of one of the slaves who permanently escaped and the 
cost of recapturing the rest.  Id. at 220.  Van Zandt argued that he had no notice they were slaves 
and that, in Ohio, all people were presumptively free.  Id. at 221.  The Supreme Court upheld the 
judgment against Van Zandt, and thus put northerners on notice that they should not assume blacks 
in their states were free.  Id. 
10
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The statute created, for the first time, a national system of law 
enforcement through the appointment of one or more federal 
commissioners in every county in the nation.  The Act of 1850 
authorized the commissioners to hear fugitive slave cases and summon 
sufficient force to secure the return of runaways.  Federal marshals and 
commissioners were empowered to call on the militia, the army, or 
create a posse to enforce the law.  The statute gratuitously declared that 
“all good citizens are hereby commanded to aid and assist in the prompt 
and efficient execution of this law,” although there was no clear remedy 
if citizens refused to help enforce the law.50  If these measures failed, 
however, and marshals were unable to prevent a rescue, they could be 
held personally liable for the value of any slave who escaped their 
custody.  No other federal law had ever provided such penalties for 
officers who were unable to implement a law. 
Someone could be dragged south as a slave without ever being 
permitted to offer his or her own voice as evidence that he or she was 
free.  The outrageousness of the testimony provision was matched by the 
provision for paying the commissioners and judges who heard these 
cases.  If a judge ruled in favor of the alleged slave, thus setting him or 
her free, the judge was entitled to a five-dollar fee.51  If the judge ruled 
for the master, he got a ten-dollar fee.52  Most northerners viewed this as 
a blatant attempt to bribe the courts.53 
The Fugitive Slave Act was an utterly one-sided law that threatened 
the liberty of every black in the North, while also jeopardizing their 
white friends, neighbors, and employers.  The “compromise” offered in 
return for this law was a ban on the public sale of slaves in the District of 
Columbia.  This ban would not harm slave owners or the system of 
slavery, but merely end the embarrassment of having slaves marched 
through the national capital in chains or publicly auctioned off in the 
shadow of the White House and Congress.54  Northerners (and even a 
few southerners) were deeply offended by this.  But southerners 
understood that the ban was merely symbolic because slave owners in 
 
 50. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 § 5. 
 51. Id. § 8. 
 52. Id. 
 53. The differential payment was based on the fact that commissioners were paid by 
collecting fees (rather than a salary) and it took much more time to fill out the paperwork necessary 
to return a fugitive slave than to set a black free.  While the different fees made economic sense, 
they created the appearance that justice was for sale in the North.  The payment scale was a public 
relations disaster for the national government and the Fillmore administration.  
 54. See generally the essays in IN THE SHADOW OF FREEDOM: THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY IN 
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2011). 
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the District could easily take their slaves to Virginia for sale.55  They 
could also privately sell their slaves.  Southern opposition to ending the 
trade in the District was not based on the fear that it would actually harm 
the system of slavery—because it clearly would not—but as a matter of 
proslavery principles.  Ending the D.C. slave trade would be an 
admission that buying and selling slaves was morally wrong—which 
extreme southern nationalists would not admit and did not believe.   
At the same time, shrewd southerners may have understood the ban 
on the trade in the national capital would actually benefit them.  The ban 
on the trade virtually ended the demands of northern Congressmen for 
an end to slavery in the District of Columbia.  Thus, what was sold to the 
northerners as a victory was strategically valuable to the South. 
In sum, the Compromise of 1850 was an enormous victory to the 
South.  It opened up vast amounts of land to slavery, much of it north of 
the Missouri Compromise line.  This territory would eventually 
accommodate four full states and parts of three others, but it might easily 
have been used to create six or seven new slave states.  It transferred ten 
million dollars from the national government to the state of Texas, which 
constituted the largest transfer of money from the national government 
to a state since the nation began.  The new fugitive slave law committed 
the national government to spending huge sums of money, created a new 
level of court officers, and vastly expanded the reach and power of the 
national government, just to accommodate slaveowners.  The law also 
trampled on states’ rights, reaffirming the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Prigg that the northern states had no right to protect the liberty of their 
black residents and citizens, even those who were born free.  The law 
provided no penalties for southerners who purposefully kidnapped or 
mistakenly seized free blacks, but provided harsh penalties for 
northerners who tried to prevent the removal of their neighbors, friends, 
and relatives, even if they believed they were free.  The law trampled on 
the rights of the free states by sending federal commissioners, marshals, 
and troops into northern communities to round up blacks.   
In return for these huge concessions, Congress banned the public 
slave trade in the District of Columbia, which as noted above, had no 
impact on the institution of slavery and did not prevent masters from 
selling their slaves across the river in Alexandria.  The North also gained 
when Congress admitted California as a free state.  But this result was 
hardly a concession to the North, because everyone understood 
 
 55. A. Glenn Crothers, The 1846 Retrocession of Alexandria:  Protecting Slavery and the 
Slave Trade in the District of Columbia, in IN THE SHADOW OF FREEDOM, supra note 54, at 141. 
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Californians wanted to enter the Union as a free state.  Even Robert 
Toombs of Georgia did “not consider the admission of California an 
aggression on the South” because he acknowledged that the new state’s 
residents were overwhelmingly opposed to slavery.56  More 
significantly, Congress and President Millard Fillmore refused to 
consider a proposed constitution from citizens of New Mexico, which 
would also have led to that territory entering the Union as a free state.57 
2. The Kansas-Nebraska Act 
Four years after the Compromise of 1850—which from a northern 
perspective might better be called the Appeasement of 185058—the 
South made new and spectacular gains in the Kansas-Nebraska Act.59  
This law provided for the organization of territorial government in the 
remaining western lands, which included all or part of the present-day 
states of Nebraska, Kansas, South Dakota, North Dakota, Montana, 
Wyoming, Colorado, and Idaho.  In 1820, Congress had banned slavery 
in all of this territory as part of the Missouri Compromise.  Extreme 
proslavery southerners had long argued that the Missouri Compromise 
was unconstitutional because Congress could not deprive them of the 
right to enter a federal territory with their property.  This argument had 
little resonance in the North or among moderate southerners, who 
accepted the power of Congress to regulate the territories.  Furthermore, 
if Congress could prohibit slavery in some territories, it could 
specifically allow slavery and protect it in other territories.  In the 
Florida Territory, for example, federal and territorial authorities 
prosecuted the ship captain Jonathan Walker when he tried to help a boat 
load of slaves escape to the British West Indies, where they would have 
been free.60  After his conviction, Walker was branded on his hand with 
the letters S.S., for “slave stealer.”61  Such support for slavery in some of 
the territories was seen, at least by moderate southerners, as a reasonable 
trade-off for banning slavery in other territories.   
After the Mexican War, a number of moderate southerners seemed 
willing to simply extend the Missouri Compromise line though the new 
territories, but southern extremists opposed this, and they were joined by 
 
 56. FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE, supra note 40, at 114. 
 57. Id. at 83-85, 89. 
 58. Finkelman, Appeasement of 1850, supra note 35. 
 59. Kansas–Nebraska Act, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (1854).   
 60. ALVIN F. OICKLE, JONATHAN WALKER: THE MAN WITH THE BRANDED HAND 1-13 
(1998). 
 61. Id. 
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two northern doughface leaders.  After Henry Clay’s Omnibus Bill 
collapsed, Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois picked up the pieces of 
Clay’s proposal and guided them through Congress one bill at a time.62  
Thus, Douglas willingly opened all the new territories to slavery, 
pleasing his southern friends and allies in the Democratic Party, and 
positioning himself to run for president in 1856.  Millard Fillmore, the 
Whig accidental president, eagerly signed the compromise bills while 
refusing to submit to Congress a constitution for New Mexico written by 
a democratically elected convention in the territory because it would 
have created a free state of New Mexico.63  Both men assumed their 
relentless support of slavery in the Compromise package would 
strengthen their presidential ambitious.  Fillmore was unable to win the 
Whig nomination in 1852, but Douglas, who was only thirty-nine years 
old, was still building his career with the presidency as his ultimate goal. 
Douglas furthered his presidential ambitions in 1854 by sponsoring 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act.  This law provided for the creation of 
territorial governments in what would become most of the Great Plains 
states.  The Missouri Compromise of 1820 had banned slavery in all of 
this area, but Douglas’s bill allowed slavery in all of the area.  Douglas 
said that the issue of slavery would be determined by “popular 
sovereignty,” inviting proslavery and antislavery settlers to move there.64  
The result was not a peaceful referendum on slavery, but a mini-Civil 
War known as Bleeding Kansas.65  Aggressive supporters of slavery, 
aided by the administrations of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, 
created a proslavery government in the territory, even though a clear 
majority of the settlers were northerners who opposed slavery.66  
Eventually, Buchanan pushed for the admission of Kansas as a slave 
state based on the Lecompton Constitution, which was written by a 
fraudulently elected convention and ratified by an equally suspect 
referendum.67   
In 1858 Douglas would break with Buchanan over Lecompton, but 
not because it would lead to a slave state in Kansas.  Douglas famously 
declared that he did not care whether slavery was voted “up or down.”68  
 
 62. POTTER, supra note 36, at 109-11. 
 63. FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE, supra note 40, at 84; POTTER, supra note 36, at 110-11 
(1976).  
 64. POTTER, supra note 36, at 172-74. 
 65. NICOLE ETCHESON, BLEEDING KANSAS: CONTESTED LIBERTY IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 
(2004). 
 66. MICHAEL F. HOLT, FRANKLIN PIERCE (2010). 
 67. POTTER, supra note 36, at 297-328. 
 68. Id. at 349. 
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Douglas objected to the Lecompton Constitution because it was written 
and ratified by a patently fraudulent process and everyone in the United 
States knew this.  But, on the main principle—Popular Sovereignty—
Douglas, Buchanan, and almost every other Democrat leader agreed that 
slavery was an issue for the settlers of the territories, not the Congress or 
the president.  It should be remembered that throughout this period, 
Democrats controlled the Senate and had there been no secession, the 
Democrats would have been able to block Lincoln at every turn.  
Furthermore, the three state majority69 that northerners had in the 
senate—the votes of six senators—was fragile and hardly dominant.  A 
solid South could always find a few northern senators—the four they 
would need—to outvote the North on significant sectional issues. 
Whatever the outcome of Kansas settlement, it is hard to see how 
southerners could complain about the process.  Fillmore and Douglas in 
1850 and Pierce and Douglas in 1854 had opened up almost all the 
territories to slavery.  That southerners were unable to win the vote in 
Kansas was a function of their preference for cotton over wheat; but that 
did not mean they might not win the settlement race in other territories.  
Most importantly, opening all the territories to slavery in 1850 in 1854 
along with the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 reflected a Congress more 
than willing to support the South.  Whatever else southerners had to 
complain about, they could not legitimately complain that Congress had 
harmed their states’ rights, or slavery, in the previous decade. 
3. The Supreme Court and Slavery in the 1850s 
The Supreme Court heard a number of cases involving slavery in 
the late 1840s and 1850s.  With one minor exception,70 slaveowners won 
every one of these cases and the Court overwhelmingly supported the 
power of Congress to assist them in recovering fugitive slaves.  In Jones 
v. Van Zandt,71 a unanimous Court held that northerners could be held 
liable for the fugitive slaves they aided even if they did not have any 
“notice” that the person they helped was a fugitive.  In this case, Van 
Zandt, an Ohio farmer, had given a ride to a group of slaves walking 
along a road in outside of Cincinnati.72  He was subsequently sued by the 
owner, Jones, for the cost of recovering them and the value of one who 
 
 69. By this time Minnesota and Oregon had become free states, along with California, as non-
slave states. 
 70. Norris v. Crocker, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 429 (1851). 
 71. Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847). 
 72. Id. at 219. 
15
Finkelman: States' Rights
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
11-FINKELMAN_MACRO AUTHOR.DOCM 6/13/2012  3:41 PM 
464 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:449 
was never recovered.73  Van Zandt argued there was a presumption of 
freedom for everyone in Ohio and thus he could not “know” that the 
people he gave the ride to were fugitive slaves.74  The Court rejected this 
argument, essentially applying the law of the South—that all blacks 
were presumptively slaves—to the free states.75  The opinion was written 
by Justice Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, and even the antislavery 
John McLean of Ohio accepted the result. 
In Strader v. Graham,76 the Court considered for the first time the 
thorny problem of slave transit into free states.  The Constitution 
allowed for the recovery of fugitive slaves, but said nothing about the 
right to voluntarily take a slave to a free state.  Strader involved three 
slave musicians who, with the permission of their master (Graham), had 
traveled on a number of occasions from Kentucky to Ohio and Indiana to 
perform.77  After a number of such trips, they boarded Strader’s 
steamboat, without Graham’s permission, and escaped.78  Graham won a 
judgment in the Kentucky courts because Strader had allowed the slaves 
on his ship without their master’s written permission, in violation of 
Kentucky law.79  On appeal, Strader argued that the slaves had become 
free under the Northwest Ordinance and the laws of Ohio and Indiana 
when Graham allowed them to go to those free jurisdictions.80  This 
argument was based on a legal theory, first developed in Somerset v. 
Stewart81 by Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, that a slave became free 
when taken to a free jurisdiction because there was no positive law 
creating slavery, and once free, the former slave was always free.  By 
1850, almost every northern state had adopted this rule, as had a many 
southern states.82  But by this time a number of slave state jurists and 
politicians had begun to question the propriety of following this rule 
when slaves returned from visits to free states.   
In Strader, the Court faced the problem indirectly.  The Kentucky 
courts had ruled that the status of Graham’s slaves was not at issue, and 
whether they were entitled to their freedom for previous trips to the 
North could only be determined if they appeared before the state 
 
 73. Id. at 220. 
 74. Id. at 221. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851). 
 77. Id. at 93. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 92-93. 
 80. Id. at 85-86. 
 81. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). 
 82. The history of this rule is set out in FINKELMAN, supra note 27. 
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courts.83  But until they appeared in a Kentucky court, they were 
presumptively slaves.  Therefore, Strader had violated Kentucky law by 
allowing Graham’s slaves on his ship and he was liable to Graham for 
their value.84  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it must defer to the 
state of Kentucky on this matter, upholding the judgment against 
Graham.85  Under this rule, the slave states were free to decide for 
themselves who was a slave and who was not.  In other words, the Court 
gave the slave states sanction to ignore free state law, and perhaps 
federal law, in determining who was a slave and who was not.  The 
decision implied that the slave states could ignore the Full Faith and 
Credit provision of Article IV of the Constitution, just as Kentucky had 
ignored the constitutions of Indiana and Ohio.  The true proslavery 
implications of this case would become apparent in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, six years later. 
A year after Strader, the Court clarified an aspect of the 
jurisprudence of fugitive slaves in Moore v. Illinois.86  In Prigg,87 the 
Court had struck down all state personal liberty laws.  In that case, 
Justice Story had declared that no state could add to the requirements for 
the return of fugitive slaves, and thus all personal liberty laws providing 
due process for alleged fugitives were unconstitutional.88  Despite this 
huge victory for slavery, in a concurring opinion Chief Justice Taney 
complained that the decision would also prevent the free states from 
helping in the return of fugitive slaves.89  But in Moore, the Court upheld 
an Illinois statute which punished Illinois citizens for harboring fugitive 
slaves.90  This was one more victory for slavery.  
Five years later, the Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford,91 the 
most notoriously proslavery decision in the nation’s jurisprudence.  The 
outcome of the case—that Scott remained a slave—was plausibly 
correct, based, if nothing else, on Strader v. Graham.92  Scott claimed 
his freedom because he had lived in the free state of Illinois and in the 
 
 83. Strader, 51 U.S. at 89. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 96-97. 
 86. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852). 
 87. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 88. Id. at 625-26. 
 89. Id. at 627-28 (Taney, J., concurring). 
 90. Moore, 55 U.S. at 22. 
 91. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 92. Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” For the 
Defendant, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219 (2008); Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred 
Scott: A Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 495 (2012). 
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Wisconsin Territory (in what later became Minnesota) where slavery 
was banned by the Compromise of 1820 (also called the Missouri 
Compromise) and various other federal laws.93  The Court initially 
planned to decide the case on the basis of Strader, and had it done so the 
case would probably be long forgotten.  But the southerners on the Court 
insisted on a more comprehensive result, which led to Taney’s massive 
and extraordinarily proslavery opinion.94  Speaking for the Court, Taney 
held that 1) slavery was a specially protected property under the 
Constitution; 2) free blacks could never be considered citizens of the 
United States and essentially had “no rights” under the Constitution; 3) 
that Congress had no power to ban slavery in the federal territories; 4) 
no law in the territories could free slaves because that would be an 
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment; and 5) that the 
Missouri Compromise unconstitutionally banned slavery in the federal 
territories, and by implication the ban on slavery in the Act creating the 
Oregon Territory was also unconstitutional.  This was a sweeping 
proslavery opinion that settled the issue of slavery in the territories by 
allowing slavery in all the territories.   
A concurring opinion by Justice Nelson of New York also directly 
telegraphed how the Court would rule on the issue of slave transit.  
Nelson noted at the very end of his opinion: 
A question has been alluded to, on the argument, namely:  the right of 
the master with his slave of transit into or through a free State, on 
Business or commercial pursuits, or in the exercise of a Federal right, 
or the discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of the United States, 
which is not before us.  This question depends upon different 
considerations and principles from the one in hand, and turns upon the 
rights and privileges secured to a common citizen of the republic under 
the Constitution of the United States.  When that question arises, we 
shall be prepared to decide it.95  
The implication was clear:  as soon as the Court had an opportunity, it 
would guarantee that masters could travel anywhere in the United States 
with their slaves.  In his “House Divided Speech,”96 Abraham Lincoln 
predicted that the logic of Dred Scott would lead to legalizing slavery in 
 
 93. These statutes are set out in PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF 
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 8-10 (1997). 
 94. The best discussion of the internal politics of the Court on this is DON E. FEHRENBACHER, 
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (1978). 
 95. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 468 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
 96. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, A House Divided: Speech at Springfield, Illinois, in 2 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 1, at 461. 
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the North through the “next Dred Scott decision.”97  Nelson’s opinion 
certainly made this seem likely. 
The final presecession decision on slavery was Ableman v. Booth,98 
arguably the most anti-states’ rights decision since Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,99 McCulloch v. Maryland,100 and Cohens v. Virginia.101  But the 
difference between the cases is striking.  Martin, McCulloch, and 
Cohens were seen as attacks on the sovereignty of southern states, 
leading to complaints by some Virginians that the Court had eviscerated 
the rights of the states.  Ableman was directed at northern states and 
supported the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.  The case began when 
Sherman Booth, an antislavery editor in Milwaukee, helped lead a mob 
that rescued a fugitive slave name Joshua Glover, who had been in 
federal custody.102  United States Marshal Stephen Ableman then 
arrested Booth.  At this point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court intervened, 
freeing Booth with a writ of habeas corpus.103  There, the Wisconsin 
Court declared that the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 was 
unconstitutional.104  The Wisconsin Supreme Court then refused to send 
a record of the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Thus, the U.S. Supreme 
Court did not decide the case until 1859, when Chief Justice Taney 
emphatically asserted:  
No State judge or court, after they are judicially informed that the party 
is imprisoned under the authority of the United States, has any right to 
interfere with him, or to require him to be brought before them.  And if 
the authority of a State, in the form of judicial process or otherwise, 
should attempt to control the marshal or other authorized officer or 
agent of the United States, in any respect, in the custody of his 
prisoner, it would be his duty to resist it, and to call to his aid any force 
that might be necessary to maintain the authority of law against illegal 
interference.  No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can 
have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the 
court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it 
beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.105  
 
 97. For a discussion of this, see FINKELMAN, supra note 27. 
 98. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
 99. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 100. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 101. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). 
 102. For a full history of the case, see H. ROBERT BAKER, THE RESCUE OF JOSHUA GLOVER: A 
FUGITIVE SLAVE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR (2006). 
 103. In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157 (1854). 
 104. Id. at 212. 
 105. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 524 (1859). 
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Northern states’ rights claims would gain no support from the Supreme 
Court.  Nor was the U.S. Supreme Court troubled by the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850.  Speaking for a unanimous Court, Taney unambiguously 
proclaimed: “the act of Congress commonly called the fugitive slave law 
is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the Constitution of the 
United States.”106  Taney noted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had 
asserted its supremacy over the federal courts.  This astounded the Chief 
Justice as he noted:  
These propositions are new in the jurisprudence of the United States, 
as well as of the States; and the supremacy of the State courts over the 
courts of the United States, in cases arising under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, is now for the first time asserted and acted 
upon in the Supreme Court of a State.107 
Ableman was a strongly nationalist opinion—as strong as anything 
Justice Joseph Story or Chief Justice John Marshall might have written.  
But it was proslavery nationalism.  It upheld the Fugitive Slave Law of 
1850 and emphatically rejected the antislavery jurisprudence of a 
northern state.  It was a decision slaveowners loved. 
4. The Proslavery 1850s 
The 1850s was a decade of enormous political success for the South 
and slavery.  In 1849, slavery was illegal in almost all of the federal 
territories.  After 1857, for the first time since the Constitution was 
adopted, slavery was legal in every federal territory.  In 1849, there was 
a weak federal fugitive slave law with few viable enforcement 
mechanisms.  After 1850, the nation developed, for the first time in 
American history, a national law enforcement bureaucracy, solely for the 
purpose of returning fugitive slaves.  In 1849, almost all the free states 
emancipated visiting slaves with no constitutional restrictions.  By 1857, 
the Supreme Court had made it clear that it would strike down such 
behavior at the first opportunity.  In the 1840s, blacks were gaining 
rights in the North, as Rhode Island enfranchised them and Ohio 
repealed its black laws.108  Black lawyers were beginning to appear in 
northern courts, and it seemed to be only a matter of time before some 
black attorney would seek admission to the bar of the U.S. Supreme 
 
 106. Id. at 526. 
 107. Id. at 514. 
 108. Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the 
Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415 (1986). 
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Court.109  By 1860, Congress and the president had teamed up to deny 
every black in the nation the right to fundamental due process when 
seized as a fugitive slave, and the Supreme Court had expanded this 
deprivation of their status by holding that blacks could never be citizens 
of the United States and that, under the Constitution, blacks “had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.”110  
Finally, in the 1850s, Congress and the Courts worked in tandem to 
undermine the rights of the free states to protect their black neighbors or 
resist the encroachments of slavery into their communities. 
III.  SECESSION AND STATES RIGHTS 
After a decade of spectacular success at the national level, in 1860-
61 the most aggressive proslavery politicians led their states out of the 
Union.  Were they concerned about states’ rights?  Was the right of the 
states to control their own domestic institutions at the heart of secession?  
The answer is clearly no. 
There was not a single example of the deprivation of states’ rights 
that southerners could complain about.  The national government did not 
threaten to end slavery in the states or even interfere with it.  In his first 
inaugural address, Lincoln reaffirmed this while quoting his own party’s 
platform on this point: 
  Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern 
States that by the accession of a Republican Administration their 
property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered.  
There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension.  
Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while 
existed and been open to their inspection.  It is found in nearly all the 
published speeches of him who now addresses you.  I do but quote 
from one of those speeches when I declare that— 
  I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the 
institution of slavery in the States where it exists.  I believe I have no 
lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.  
  Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge 
that I had made this and many similar declarations and had never 
recanted them; and more than this, they placed in the platform for my 
acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and 
emphatic resolution which I now read:   
 
 109. Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as 
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1994). 
 110. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). 
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  “Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the 
States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its 
own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, 
is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and 
endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless 
invasion by armed force of the soil of any State or Territory, no matter 
what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.”111  
Lincoln certainly hated slavery, and always had.  But, he 
understood the Constitution precisely as did John C. Calhoun or 
Jefferson Davis:  that the national government had no power to regulate 
slavery in the states.  Lincoln had “no inclination” to interfere with 
slavery in the states because he had no power to do so; nor did any other 
politician in the Lincoln administration or in Congress.  Southern states’ 
rights had not been threatened in the 1850s and there was no threat to 
them from the incoming administration.  Whatever Lincoln’s policies 
were towards the territories, there was no threat to states’ rights in the 
South.  The secession documents underscore this.  Most of the 
complaints of the seceding states are about national policies outside the 
southern states or about actions of the North. 
The most important state right that any of the southern states 
claimed was that they had the “right” to secede.  The secessionists 
claimed that this right was rooted in the inherent sovereignty of the 
states.  South Carolina noted that the Federal Government’s 
“encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified” 
the state in “withdrawing from the Federal Union” and that “now the 
State of South Carolina” had “resumed her separate and equal place 
among nations.”112  Thus, the right to secession was rooted in a 
particular view of states’ rights that most of the states of the Union had 
never accepted.  However, the substantive reasons for secession were not 
the rights of the states.  While rhetorically South Carolina and other 
seceding states may have claimed that the national government had 
“encroached” on their “reserved rights,” none of the seceding states 
offered any examples of this, because in fact there were none.  Instead, 
all of their examples—the reasons they offered to justify secession—
were about national policy involving slavery in the territories, the 
admission of new slave states, John Brown’s raid at Harpers Ferry, 
northern opposition to slavery, the refusal of northern states to 
 
 111. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text, Mar. 4, 1861, in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262-63 (1953). 
 112. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South 
Carolina from the Federal Union, supra note 8. 
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aggressively help in the return of fugitives slaves, and the other actions 
by northern state government that were hostile to slavery.  Most of these 
complaints were not in fact about the national government impinging on 
southern states’ rights, rather they were complaints that the national 
government had note impinged on northern states’ rights.  Thus, there 
are in fact, four significant ironies to the states’ rights issue and 
secession.   
First, because the Constitution of 1787 was deeply protective of 
slavery, and the Supreme Court enhanced this protection, there was a 
direct tie to nationalism and slavery.  This meant that, before 1861, the 
slave states did not need to have a states’ rights ideology to protect their 
most important social and economic institutions.  A nationalist position 
did that for them.  Most of the complaints about the national government 
and slavery in the secessionist documents were not about the national 
government impinging on southern states’ rights.  For example, South 
Carolina complained that the northern states were not helping to enforce 
the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, and thus “laws of the General 
Government have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution.”113   
Second, because the Constitution was proslavery and supporters of 
slavery controlled the national government almost continuously from 
1801 until 1861, the most important proponents of states’ rights in the 
antebellum period were northern opponents of slavery.  Northerners 
needed to assert states’ rights in order to protect their free blacks from 
kidnapping and protect their fugitive slave neighbors from being 
returned to bondage.  Thus, starting in the 1820s, most free states passed 
personal liberty laws, which frustrated the implementation of the 
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793.  In the 1830s, courts in Pennsylvania, New 
York, and New Jersey upheld state personal liberty laws that 
undermined the 1793 law and effectively held that the 1793 law was 
unconstitutional, in part on states’ rights grounds.114  In the early 1840s, 
Governor William H. Seward of New York and three successive 
governors of Maine refused to surrender northern free blacks wanted in 
the South for helping slaves escape.  Just before the Civil War, 
Governors Salmon P. Chase and William Dennison of Ohio also refused 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. See State v. Sheriff of Burlington, No. 36286 (N.J. 1836) (also known as Nathan, Alias 
Alex. Helmsley v. State); Jack v. Martin, 14 Wend. 507 (N.Y. 1835).  State v. Sheriff of Burlington, 
which is unreported, is discussed in Paul Finkelman, State Constitutional Protections of Liberty and 
the Antebellum New Jersey Supreme Court: Chief Justice Hornblower and the Fugitive Slave Law 
of 1793, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 753 (1992).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld its state personal 
liberty law in an unreported opinion in Prigg v. Pennsylvania. 
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to surrender a free black who had helped a slave escape.115  These 
northern governors rested their actions on states’ rights arguments.116  
Finally, after the Supreme Court struck down the first wave of northern 
personal liberty laws in Prigg,117 many northern states responded with 
new laws, which simply withdrew all northern cooperation in the return 
of fugitive slaves.118  This was a variant of states’ rights philosophy.  In 
these laws, passed in the 1840s and more so in the next decade after the 
adoption of the fugitive slave law of 1850, the northern states took the 
position that their states did not have to cooperate with the federal 
government.  In doing so, they made enforcement of the 1850 law 
difficult, or in some places, nearly impossible.  
Third, the most aggressive states’ rights arguments of the 
antebellum decade came from northerners, particularly judges in 
Ohio,119 New York,120 and most of all Wisconsin.121  In response to the 
Oberlin-Wellington rescue in Ohio, that state’s supreme court came 
within one vote of causing a confrontation with the federal government 
by issuing a writ of habeas corpus directed at the U.S. marshal in 
Cleveland.122  The Wisconsin Supreme Court was not so circumspect 
and in fact issued a writ of habeas corpus that forced U.S. Marshall 
Stephen Ableman to surrender the abolitionist Sherman Booth after he 
had been arrested for helping rescue a fugitive slave.  In New York, in 
Lemmon v. The People, the state’s highest court rejected any measure of 
comity towards visiting southerners.123  Here, the state emancipated 
eight Virginia slaves who were brought into the state for just long 
enough to take the next steamboat to New Orleans.124  They were in the 
city only because New York was the only east coast port that had direct 
transit to New Orleans.  The decision in Lemmon was legitimate within 
 
 115. See Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861). 
 116. Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN 
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125-58 (Kermit L. Hall & 
James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989); Paul Finkelman, The Protection of Black Rights in Seward’s New 
York, 34 CIV. WAR HIS. 211-34 (1988); Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Federalism, and Criminal 
Extradition in Antebellum America: The New York-Virginia Controversy, 1839-1846, in GERMAN 
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT: CONTEXTS, INTERACTION, AND HISTORICAL 
REALITIES 293-327 (Hermann Wellenreuther ed., 1990). 
 117. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
 118. See generally MORRIS, supra note 26. 
 119. Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859). 
 120. Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860). 
 121. In re Booth & Rycraft, 3 Wis. 157 (1854), rev’d, Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 
506 (1859). 
 122. Bushnell, 9 Ohio St. at 77. 
 123. Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 565. 
 124. Id. 
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the context of American constitutional law and state police powers.  But, 
southerners believed this decision, and similar ones in other states, 
violated the spirit of the Union and the comity that should be given to 
citizens of other states.  In addition, some southerners believed the 
decision in Lemmon actually violated the Commerce Clause or the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution because it denied 
southerners the right to travel throughout the United States with their 
constitutionally protected property and it interfered with interstate 
commerce.  
Finally, while southerners proclaimed their support for states’ 
rights, they insisted that the road to states’ rights ran in only one 
direction.  They denied that northerners had a right to assert their states’ 
rights when it came to slavery.  Thus, for example, South Carolina 
complained that the northern states  
assume the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic 
institutions; and have denied the rights of property established in 
fifteen of the States and recognized by the Constitution; they have 
denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted 
open establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is 
to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other 
States.125  
In other words, South Carolina opposed the idea that the free states 
could have their “states’ rights” to allow antislavery organizations to 
operate.  Similarly, South Carolina denounced the Lemmon decision as a 
violation of comity without any sense of the irony that it was actually 
opposing states’ rights.  Significantly, since the 1820s, South Carolina 
had successfully refused to allow northern free black sailors to enter its 
ports.  Almost every other southern state with an ocean port passed a 
similar black seamen’s law.  Under these laws, free black sailors were 
jailed while their ships were in southern ports and were only released 
when the ship was about to sail, if the ship captain paid the jailer for 
feeding and housing these sailors.  Although believing such laws 
violated the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and the treaty 
power, Justice William Johnson, while riding circuit, refused to interfere 
with the enforcement of these laws.126  The southern states insisted that 
states’ rights empowered them to arrest free black sailors (or any other 
free blacks) entering their jurisdiction.  In the 1840s, Massachusetts sent 
 
 125. Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South 
Carolina from the Federal Union, supra note 8. 
 126. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 496-98 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823). 
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commissioners to South Carolina and Louisiana to negotiate some 
accommodation for free black sailors from the North, but both states 
refused to meet with the commissioners and basically expelled them.127    
Ironically then, the southern states argued that states’ rights allowed 
them to decide who they would let into their states.  But, when 
northerners applied the same logic to visiting southerners with slaves, 
South Carolina suddenly rejected its support for states’ rights, and 
argued this was grounds for secession. 
Thus, in the end, secession was not based on the need of the 
southern states to protect their states’ rights from an aggressive national 
government.  On the contrary, the southern states argued that they were 
leaving because the northern states insisted on using their own states’ 
rights to oppose slavery.  Nor was it about the “encroachments” of the 
national government, because there were none.  Nor could it be about the 
failure of the national government to protect slavery.  Federal troops had 
been used to suppress John Brown’s invasion of Harpers Ferry, Virginia.  
Federal troops had been used to bring the fugitive slave Anthony Burns 
out of Boston.  The national government had expended enormous 
resources to prosecute people who rescued, or tried to rescue, fugitive 
slaves in New York,128 Massachusetts,129 Pennsylvania,130 Ohio, 131  
Wisconsin,132 Illinois,133 and elsewhere.  While many of those 
prosecutions were unsuccessful, there were convictions in Ohio after the 
Oberlin rescue, in Wisconsin after the Joshua Glover rescue, and in other 
places.  While Wisconsin may have resisted the fugitive slave law in 
Sherman Booth’s case, the government won in the end and Booth’s 
printing press was seized and sold for the benefit of the slave owner,134 
and after the Supreme Court decision, Booth went to jail and the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to intervene.135  Despite the intense 
 
 127. Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, supra note 116.  
 128. United States v. Cobb, 25 F. Cas. 481 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1857); United States v. Reed, 27 F. 
Cas. 727 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852). 
 129. United States v. Stowell, 27 F. Cas. 1350 (C.C.D. Mass. 1854); United States v. Scott, 27 
F. Cas. 990 (D. Mass. 1851); United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851). 
 130. United States v. Hanway, 26 F. Cas. 105 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851). 
 131. JACOB R. SHIPHERD, HISTORY OF THE OBERLIN-WELLINGTON RESCUE (Boston, John P. 
Jewett & Co. 1859). 
 132. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); United States v. Rycraft, 27 F. Cas. 
918 (D. Wis. 1854). 
 133. United States v. Hossack, 26 F. Cas. 378 (N.D. Ill. 1860) (unreported).  For a full 
discussion of this case, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 128-34 (1985). 
 134. In June 1861, after the Civil War had begun, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the 
validity of this sale in Arnold v. Booth, 14 Wis. 180 (1861). 
 135. Ableman v. Booth, 11 Wis. 498 (1859). 
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opposition to the Fugitive Slave Law in northern Ohio, the Buchanan 
administration managed to cobble together two juries made up of 
supporters of the law and convict two of the Oberlin rescuers.136  The 
Ohio Supreme Court refused to assert its states’ rights to release the 
Oberlin rescuers from federal custody.137 
This history showed a growing northern states’ rights opposition to 
slavery but also a firm federal support of slavery that, if anything, 
trampled on the states’ rights of the North.  But for the seceding states, 
these northern developments were intolerable.  So too were northern 
demands for political actions against the spread of slavery.  Georgia 
could not complain that slavery was excluded from the federal territories 
because it was allowed in all the federal territories in 1860.  Georgia 
could only complain that “Northern anti-slavery men of all parties 
asserted the right to exclude slavery from the territory by Congressional 
legislation and demanded the prompt and efficient exercise of this power 
to that end,” and that these demands were “insulting and 
unconstitutional.”138  Georgia complained that the incoming Lincoln 
administration was opposed to allowing slavery in the territories, and 
this justified secession.  In other words, without any legislation on the 
table, Georgia claimed it could leave the Union because it opposed the 
platform of the new president.  Secession was not about “states’ rights,” 
but about political power.  Southerners did not like the outcome of the 
presidential election, so they claimed the right to leave the Union. 
Mississippi was equally appalled at northern states’ rights actions 
and beliefs.  Mississippi complained that northerners had “broken the 
compact which our fathers pledged their faith to maintain.”139  This was 
because in the North “hostility” to slavery “advocates negro equality, 
socially and politically, and promotes insurrection and incendiarism in 
our midst.”140  This hostility had “enlisted” the North’s “press, its pulpit 
and its schools against us, until the whole popular mind of the North is 
excited and inflamed with prejudice.”141  Northerners had “made 
combinations and formed associations to carry out” their “schemes of 
emancipation in the States and wherever else slavery exists.”142  In other 
words, northerners exercised their rights of free speech, freedom of 
 
 136. SHIPHERD, supra note 131. 
 137. Ex parte Bushnell, Ex parte Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77 (1859). 
 138. Georgia Secession, supra note 9. 
 139. A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of the 
State of Mississippi from the Federal Union, supra note 10. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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religion, and state political autonomy to support policies the South did 
not like.  The issues were not based on constitutionalism or states’ 
rights, but on political power and the power of ideas.  Southerners left 
the Union because they disagreed with northerners.  Mississippi 
complained that northerners believed in “negro equality”143 and this was 
enough to justify secession.  
Texas also asserted that it was leaving the Union because of 
northern states’ rights, not the denial of southern states’ rights.  The 
Texans complained:  
The States of Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, 
Michigan and Iowa, by solemn legislative enactments, have 
deliberately, directly or indirectly violated the 3rd clause of the 2nd 
section of the 4th article [the fugitive slave clause] of the federal 
constitution, and laws passed in pursuance thereof; thereby annulling a 
material provision of the compact, designed by its framers to 
perpetuate the amity between the members of the confederacy and to 
secure the rights of the slave-holding States in their domestic 
institutions—a provision founded in justice and wisdom, and without 
the enforcement of which the compact fails to accomplish the object of 
its creation.144   
Like the secessionists in Mississippi, Texans complained that 
northerners refused to agree with them on the fundamental inequality of 
blacks.  Texans declared they had to leave the Union because 
northerners were “proclaiming the debasing doctrine of equality of all 
men, irrespective of race or color—a doctrine at war with nature, in 
opposition to the experience of mankind, and in violation of the plainest 
revelations of Divine Law.”145 
In the end, the root of secession was just as Alexander Stephens 
said:  racism and slavery.  For the first time in its history, the United 
States had elected a president who was prepared to stand up to the 
demands of slavery and fight its spread.  He had no power—and thus no 
inclination—to interfere with slavery in the states.  He would not 
trample on the states’ rights of the South.  But, he would fight slavery on 
the political level.  Northerners agreed with him.  Having legitimately 
 
 143. Most northern whites of course did not believe in racial equality. 
 144. A Declaration of the Causes which Impel the State of Texas to Secede from the Federal 
Union, reprinted in Yale Law School, Confederate States of America: Documents, JOURNAL OF THE 
SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 61-66 (E.W. Winkler), available at http://sunsite.utk.edu/civil-
war/reasons.html (last visited May 11, 2012).   
 145. Id. 
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lost the election, southerners had two choices.  They could accept the 
outcome of the election and participate in politics.  Or, they could turn 
against their own country.   
In 1860-61, southerners could not legitimately claim, as their 
ancestors had in the Declaration of Independence, that they were being 
denied a place at the political table or a voice in the political process.  
Americans in 1776 had no political voice in Britain, no seats in 
Parliament, and no vote.  Southerners held almost half the seats in the 
Senate and with their northern Democratic allies they could control that 
body; they were a majority of the Supreme Court, and of the four 
northerners on the Court only the aging John McLean—the longest 
serving Justice—was even moderately opposed to slavery, and he had 
voted in favor of the Fugitive Slave Laws on a number of occasions.146  
While a minority in the House of Representatives, southerners had still 
been able to pass enormously significant legislation supporting slavery 
in the previous decade.   
Thus, the decision to leave the Union was not about access to 
politics; it was about whether southerners could win every election, or 
control any northerner who won, thus maintaining their version of racial 
hegemony, and protecting slavery.  Having lost the election, they feared 
they would lose more in the future.  While most northerners rejected full 
racial equality, blacks voted in some northern states and had some rights 
in all the free states.  This, along with hostility to slavery, was reason 
enough to leave the Union.  The decision was of course a disaster.  
Southern leaders believed their own ideology and followed their 
prejudices down a horrible road that led to war and destruction.  Slavery 
was safe within the Union, where the Constitution protected slavery at 
every turn,147 and where the South had a perpetual veto over all 
Constitutional amendments.148   
But once the South rejected the Constitution, and southerners who 
had taken an oath to defend the Constitution made war on their own 
country, the protections were gone.  In the end, secession led to exactly 
what the southern disunionists—some might call them the southern 
 
 146. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 
How.) 215 (1847).  On McLean and antislavery, see Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate 
Abolitionist and Supreme Court Politician, 62 VANDERBILT L. REV. 519 (2009). 
 147. For a discussion of the proslavery nature of the Constitution, see PAUL FINKELMAN, 
SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS:  RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001). 
 148. It takes three-fourths of the states to ratify a constitutional amendment.  In 1860 there 
were fifteen slave states.  If all of these states had remained in the Union, to this day, in 2012, it 
would be impossible to end slavery by amendment, since it would take forty-five free states to 
outvote the fifteen slave states. 
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traitors—feared most:  an end to slavery, and at least formal 
constitutional equality for all American, no matter what their race.  It led 
to what Lincoln memorably called a New Birth of Freedom.  
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